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 ‘Experience is what you get when you need it most.’ (Unknown 
origin)
Scenario
Under the leadership of Pete, a ski-mountaineering guide, a group 
of six skiers make an early start from the Grands Montets cable car 
station above Chamonix – the start of the week-long Haute Route ski 
tour to Zermatt in Switzerland. On the big  (2 200 m) but easy descent 
to the Argentière glacier, differences in the skiing competencies of 
the team members are already noticeable. Opting to reach the Trient 
hut that evening in one big push, they agree to forego an early finish 
to the day at the nearby Argentière hut. Then, on the ascent up the 
Chardonnet glacier to the Col de Chardonnet, their skill differences 
are further pronounced by the technical challenges of doing kick 
turns on the steep, frozen snow. To the growing irritation of the 
competent Sebastian, two of the skiers, Jo and Dave, have to be shown 
how to use their ski crampons effectively. Reaching the Col, the team 
now faces one of the steepest descents on the Haute Route, usually 
done with a rope belay.
There is some delay while Pete explains that he wants them all to 
sideslip the descent while roped, but again Jo and Dave are uncertain 
precisely how this should be done. Sebastian then notes with agitation 
that the mountaintops have disappeared into cloud, and exclaims: 
‘Let’s just ski down! We are wasting time!’ Pete simply ignores him.
Then, without further ado, and mumbling with clear irritation 
about the ‘incompetence’ of the others, Sebastian launches off the Col 
on his skis. He manages a few deft, tight turns in the narrow couloir, 
but then catches an edge and tumbles out of sight. The team looks 
on with shock at his abrupt action, but then shock turns to horror 
when Sebastian can be seen sliding to a stop on the slope below the 
couloir. His skis are gone, and his left leg is at an impossible angle. 
A blood-curdling scream comes up from below and echoes from the 
shrouded cliffs around them, sharply emphasising the rapid change 
from a sunny, fun day to a grey nightmare. The Trient hut, on the 
other side of the Fenêtre de Saleina and the Trient glacier, now seems 
very, very far away …
Background
One’s first reaction is to ‘blame’ Sebastian for his ‘idiotic’ behaviour. 
His needlessly impulsive act has not only caused him serious injury, 
but also thrust the group into a precarious situation. They need to 
seek urgent rescue from their remote location in rapidly deteriorat-
ing conditions, putting themselves at more risk. Yet, on reflection, 
perhaps one could ask:
• What really caused the accident?
• Could it have been avoided?
• How?
And perhaps one should think, before the outset of any wilderness 
trip:
• Can one predict/forecast accidents or high-risk situations?
• What are those predictors?
• If recognised, how can they be mitigated?
• What specific leadership roles or actions are required to avoid risk 
and accidents?
• What are followership roles? How and when should followers 
speak up when leadership is below par?
These questions should be addressed at the outset and on an ongoing 
basis during all stages of any wilderness excursion. How is this done, 
and where do these non-objective dynamics fit into mitigation of the 
obvious and compelling risks of wilderness adventures?
There are at least three important and distinct sets of factors that 
may impact on the safety and efficiency of wilderness activities: 
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environmental factors, technical skills, and non-technical skills, 
otherwise known as human factors (HFs). While much attention 
is usually paid to the first two categories (is the weather OK, how 
old are your ropes, what is your skill level?), the third – HFs – is 
often disregarded. In many, if not most, instances of serious medical 
problems in the wilderness, it is precisely the HFs that are most 
important in risk prevention and mitigation. Despite HFs being 
distinct from the actual ‘agents’ of accidents, such as rock falls, 
avalanches or a siphon in a whitewater river, they have been clearly 
shown to be the most common cause of accidents. A meticulous 
review[1] of skydiving accidents in the USA clearly showed that as 
many as 86% of all fatal skydiving accidents are caused by HFs, and 
not environmental or technical factors. This article will focus on 
why and how HFs are the ultimate cause of accidents, and how this 
knowledge can reduce risks in the wilderness environment.
Remarkably little has been written about the role of HFs in the 
wilderness environment,[2,3] but there is a vast literature on their 
causative risks in aviation[4] and more recently in healthcare.[5-7] 
However, unlike healthcare, in aviation and wilderness adventures 
practitioners share a commonality: they are personally involved in 
the accidents. Nonetheless, even in healthcare, behavioural factors of 
the practitioner or care team may be the ultimate cause of accidents. 
Therefore, much of what is written on HFs in these diverse settings 
can be applied to causes of accidents in the wilderness.
Human failure
It is perceived that most accidents are caused by human errors, but 
human mistakes have a complex causality themselves. Using Fig. 1, 
we are able to classify Sebastian’s error as a deliberate exceptional 
violation (breaking the rules in an attempt to solve an acute problem) 
and therefore perceived with shock by his teammates. Yet we can 
argue that Pete could probably have avoided Sebastian’s impulsive 
behaviour by earlier assertive action. Pete’s fault can be classified as an 
inadvertent thinking error due to a knowledge-based mistake (lacking 
the insight and experience to recognise deteriorating circumstances). 
As a guide, Pete should have known that frustration may induce 
irrational behaviour in some people. On the other hand, the other 
team members may be blamed for a rule-based inadvertent thinking 
error (they should have been aware that they should speak up in the 
absence of good leadership). Also, the team should have known that 
safety is not the sole responsibility of Pete as team leader. All these 
errors by Pete and his team members were proximal to and directly 
led to the collective failure in avoiding Sebastian’s ‘final’ irrational 
action that ‘caused’ their precarious situation.
Human errors are unavoidable (‘to err is human’), and are 
generally executed within a context or system that may be adapted 
to prevent such errors from happening in the first place. Sebastian’s 
error was probably avoidable, but what could have been different 
in the team’s context or system to predict and avoid this accident? 
Is it possible, during all wilderness excursions, to monitor the non-
concrete, almost intangible HFs at work in a group? And will an acute 
awareness of these factors allow one to predict when risks are rising, 
and an accident is about to happen?
Human factors
Besides the many recognisable objective dangers of the wilderness 
environment and the (very rare) failure of technical equipment, there 
is a third causative component to consider when trying to understand 
why things go badly wrong: the knowledge, recognition and correct 
interpretation of human (or non-technical, subjective) factors.
There are several broad definitions of HFs commonly employed in 
various contexts:
• HFs concern the interactions between people and technical 
components in complex systems.[6]
• HFs (or ergonomics) is the scientific discipline concerned with the 
understanding of interactions among humans and other elements 
of a system, and the profession that applies theory, principles, data 
and methods to design in order to optimise human wellbeing and 
overall system performance.[9]
• HFs science attempts to design systems that support human 
performance and are resilient to unanticipated events.[7]
Even though these definitions are generic, they all share ‘the primary 
goal of human factors science to promote efficiency, safety and 
effectiveness by improving the design of technologies, processes and 
work systems’.[10]
There is no definition of HFs specific to wilderness travel scenarios, 
but to be useful it should comprise both what they are and what they 
aim to achieve. Such a proposed definition could be that monitoring 
HFs is ‘the continuous process of identifying those activities and 
decisions during a risky wilderness endeavour that may prevent or 
contain human error’. Or, put in another, more practical way, that it 
is the continuous process of identifying and avoiding the activities, 
interactions and decisions that may jeopardise a safe and effective 
response to adverse events. HFs embody a collective habit of continuous 
and conscious decision-making: all actions are continuously weighed 
up against present as well as anticipated circumstances, and placed in 
the context of the team, its functioning, resources and capacity, and 
the external environment. This active awareness then informs critical 
personal and team decision-making, which is core to safety.
Fig. 1. Human failure types (adapted from Health and Safety Executive[8]).
HUMAN FAILURE
  DELIBERATE VIOLATIONS
EXCEPTIONAL
INADVERTENT ERRORS
ACTION 
ERROR
THINKING 
ERROR
ROUTINE SITUATIONAL
Knowledge-
based
MISTAKE
Action-based
SLIP
Memory-
based
LAPSE
Rule-based
MISTAKE
SLIP (comission) Skill-based, familiar tasks that 
may occur if attention is diverted 
momentarily
LAPSE (omission) Resulting action is not intended: ‘not 
doing what you were meant to do’
RULE-BASED 
MISTAKE
Errors of judgement: mental processes 
linked to planning, information 
gathering, communication, etc.
KNOWLEDGE-
BASED MISTAKE
Action as planned, but ‘doing the 
wrong thing believing it to be right’
ROUTINE Deliberate deviations from rules 
(violations)
SITUATIONAL Knowingly fail to follow procedures, to 
save time or effort
EXCEPTIONAL Well-meaning but misguided action to 
‘get the job done’
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Merely observing the interplay of HFs per se does not reduce human 
error. But by understanding how, in a risky context, HFs allow serious 
human errors to happen, timely systemic and behavioural safeguards 
may be introduced. It recognises the need to have checks and 
balances in place that will diminish those errors, or possibly mitigate 
their effects if and when they occur.
Broadly speaking, HFs can be grouped into three broad categories:
1. The interpersonal skills of teamwork, leadership and communica-
tion
2. The cognitive skills of situational awareness and decision-making
3. The psychophysiology of stress and fatigue.
There are said to be more than 300 HFs, but the so-called ‘Dirty Dozen’ 
(Table 1), originally developed for aircraft maintenance crews,[11] are 
readily transferable to the context of wilderness activities. Most are 
self-evident, but unless explicitly introduced to the members of a 
team, and then continuously monitored during the activities of the 
team, any one or a combination of these factors indicates imminent 
systemic failure. How then is the awareness of these factors made to 
function in reality, to improve safety for everyone?
Team building
Central to the effective implementation of HFs is the concept of 
working as a team, which relies on the awareness of HFs by all team 
members, from the leader to the least experienced, to become a 
strong team. But how is a strong team different from an informal 
group? Teams are synergistic entities, with mutiple and diverse skill 
inputs bonded by a team ethic that makes them cohesively responsive 
to dynamic demands. Table 2 outlines the characteristics that 
distinguish groups from teams.
A critical component of the success of team building and 
functioning lies in the balance between leadership and followership.
Leadership
One of the overarching roles of a leader is to bond an informal group 
of people into a team to serve a common purpose. In wilderness 
adventures, that purpose is to enhance safety and to avoid risk and 
error. The evolution from an informal group to a structured team 
should be engaged in and facilitated as soon as possible – as an 
explicit activity.
To create an effective team, it is necessary that the following 
10 aspects, as appropriate, are introduced by the team leader, 
then discussed, clarified, agreed upon and understood by all team 
members before the activity starts:[11]
1.  A clearly defined and maintained aim, or goal
2.  Each team member’s roles and responsibilities
3.  Communication methods
4.  Limitations and boundaries of team and individual action
5.  Emergency procedures
6.  Individual expectations and concerns
7.  What defines a successful outcome
8.  Debriefing arrangements
9.  Team dismissal arrangements
10. Opportunities for questions and clarification.
Followership
On the other hand, members of the group need to actively engage 
in followership. Followership is the willingness and capacity of all 
individuals in a group to actively follow the leader of that group. 
Importantly, however, followership is not the passive acceptance of 
guidance, but rather a constructively critical and engaged involvement 
in making a success of the aims of the team by:[13]
1.  Actively questioning and evaluating the mission progress
2.  Analysing the overall situation
3.   Continuously revising one’s personal understanding of the mission 
based on these evaluations and analyses
4.  Using assertive but constructive behaviour when necessary
5.  Making suggestions
6.  Providing relevant information without being asked
7.  Asking questions as necessary
8.  Confronting ambiguities
9.  Stating opinions on decisions/procedures
10. Refusing unreasonable requests.
The best teams in a wilderness context are characterised by 
‘leaderless leadership’ (J H Graafland, unpublished Mountain Club 
of South Africa Mountain Leadership Course Notes, undated, 
available from MCSA (Cape Town Section), Hatfield Street, Cape 
Town, email mcsacapetown@iafrica.com). This occurs when the 
climate is created for a team to function efficiently without the 
need for continuous reliance on the team leader. In this role, the 
team leader’s functions are similar to those of a conductor of fully 
engaged members of an orchestra. Team members may be skilled in 
very different ways, but they all contribute variously to a cohesive 
successful outcome. This is in stark contrast to ‘groupthink’,[14] which 
is the custom in many groups of thinking or making decisions 
Table 1. The ‘Dirty Dozen’ human factors[11]
1.  Lack of 
communication
5. Complacency 9.  Lack of  
knowledge
2. Distraction 6. Lack of teamwork 10. Fatigue
3. Lack of resources 7. Pressure 11.  Lack of 
assertiveness
4. Stress 8. Lack of awareness 12. Norms
Table 2. Characteristics that distinguish an informal group from a strong team (adapted from Chand[12])
Informal GROUPS Strong TEAMS
Lack of previous opportunity to engage in collective work requiring 
joint effort
Members work with both individual and mutual accountability, 
implementing complementary skills
Lack of positive synergy to create solutions to complex problems Evidence of positive synergy:
• bounce ideas off one another
• correct one another’s mistakes
• apply diverse knowledge base to problems
• accomplish work too difficult for any individual to achieve
Parallel performances not greater than the sum of individual inputs Performances overlap to become greater than sum of individual inputs
Less responsive to dynamic environments Flexible response to dynamic environments
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by consensus in a way that discourages creativity or individual 
responsibility, usually to avoid disharmony and conflict. However, in 
the ‘leaderless’ group, differing opinions and options are compared 
by frank discussion to reach a best solution. The discussion is guided 
by the team leader, who holds team members’ opinions in the same 
regard as his or her own.
Situational awareness
Each team member experiences the demands and challenges of the 
wilderness environment in different ways, and some may therefore 
recognise circumstances leading to human error before other, even 
very experienced, team members. The ability to sense ‘trouble 
brewing’ before the trouble occurs – to trust and act on gut feel – is 
called situational awareness (SA).
SA is a skill learned by experience, and is defined as ‘the perception 
of the elements in the environment within a volume of time and 
space, the comprehension of their meaning, and the projection of 
their status into the near future’[15] – in other words, it is the degree of 
the accuracy of one’s perception of environmental reality. It is about 
every team member monitoring the ‘team-in-the-environment’ so 
that potential problems will be detected and corrected before they 
escalate. SA is the skill of anticipating future contingencies based on 
the knowledge of the past (experience) and the present (awareness), 
and then projecting current circumstances into the future. 
Fig. 2 illustrates the concept of heightened team SA. In a team 
of four, each member will have a differing SA of a complex and 
dynamic process or environment. When all team members are 
actively situationally aware (A), the intersection of their awareness 
raises the team’s shared or ‘distributed’ SA to very high levels (the 
red kite). This is an example of the synergistic effect of good team 
functioning, which significantly mitigates risk. Yet, as soon as one 
or two team members are distracted (e.g. No. 4 in team B, who has a 
slight effect on No. 3), the combined team SA is seriously diminished 
(the red splinter).
Conclusion: The importance of HFs  
to mitigate risk
Risk avoidance relies firstly on adequate levels of experience, ability 
and competence of team members to deal with current circumstances 
and recognise potential problems. Secondly, risk avoidance relies on 
a team understanding that the norm is to communicate any concerns 
to the team and its leader with assertiveness. Poor knowledge and 
understanding of potential risks, poor team communication, and the 
pressure to avoid delays may discourage competent followership. 
Complacency, distraction and fatigue are widely variable personal 
characteristics that blunt awareness and generate team stress, which 
handicaps the teamwork required to maintain SA. The maintenance 
of shared SA is a powerful resource to reduce risk and it, in turn, 
is directly dependent on these HFs. Ignorance of the influence of 
HFs will predictably jeopardise optimal team functioning: in a team 
that is not responsive to the dynamic wilderness environment, SA 
is significantly weakened, allowing risks to escalate dangerously. In 
contrast, if attention is paid to the HFs that shape a team, it is possible 
to avoid or minimise the risk of wilderness accidents.
Finally, when dealing with risk in complex systems, it is worth 
noting that experience is inferior to currency. Recent exposure to 
all the demands of the activity is more valuable to the efficient 
assessment of and response to high-risk events than experience 
only. We often assume (incorrectly) that activity is thought-
directed, i.e. proactive rather than reactive. In reality, most activity 
is simply reactive and little or no attempt is made to think first, 
particularly in experienced team members. Reactive behaviour is 
firstly based on old value systems and personal perceptions. More 
importantly, the second driver of reactive behaviour is experience 
and the failure to recognise that past performance is not a measure 
of future success. Experience tends to shoehorn new situations into 
old solutions. High-risk situations demand experts with currency 
to devise novel approaches, every time: old skills, but requiring 
inventive solutions! (Duncan Nel, leadership consultant – personal 
communication, May 2017.)
Deconstructing the scenario: 
Comments to illustrate the practical 
application of HFs
1. Under the leadership of Pete, an experienced ski-mountaineering 
guide, a group of six skiers …
 There is adequate time, but no attempt is made at the outset to 
begin to create a cohesive team from the informal group by a 
thorough pre-depature briefing. 
2. … there are noticeable differences in the skiing competencies of the 
team members.
 Obvious skill differences are not a problem as long as they are 
within the skill levels required to complete the Haute Route. If 
explicitly assessed, they may create opportunities for a team to 
address and enhance the skills of all, especially those who are 
less skilled – a shrewd tool to create team cohesion. Awareness 
and acknowledgement of differing levels of skill is important – 
this allows focus on, compensation for and explicit acceptance 
of lower levels of skill by all team members, and cognisance of 
a potential Achilles heel: recognition of the fact that in high-
risk environments the group will perform to the level of its least 
competent member.
3. … they agree to forego an early finish to the day at the nearby 
Argentière hut.
Not stopping at the first hut fosters an atmosphere of time pressure, 
while compromised decision-making skills by fatigued bodies and 
minds increase the risk of accidents. In contrast, by stopping early, 
the extra time would offer the opportunity to forge team bonds, 
and further assess different skill levels in the stress-free ambiance 
of the hut’s safer environment.
4.  … their skill differences are further pronounced by the technical 
challenges …
An opportunity is missed to replan progress and spend time to 
teach and demonstrate the special skills required on the difficult 
glacier terrain, and then descend back to the Argentière hut. This 
strategy will also validate and reinforce the acceptance of justified 
delays in progress.
Fig. 2. Team situational awareness in a focused team (A: red kite) and a less 
focused team (B: red splinter). (Figure developed from an idea of Endsley.[15])
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5.  To the further irritation of the competent Sebastian, two of the 
skiers, Jo and Dave, have to be shown how to use their ski crampons 
effectively.
 This is an opportunity to engage the skilled Sebastian to instruct 
those who are less skilled, thereby positively redirecting his 
frustration. An earlier open acknowledgement of lower levels 
of skill of some team members would have reduced Sebastian’s 
expectations of the group, thereby reducing his frustration at the 
lack of prowess and progress.
6.  There is some delay while Pete explains that he wants all to sideslip 
the descent while roped, but again Jo and Dave are uncertain 
precisely how this is done.
 Pete could have defused Sebastian’s frustration further by asking 
him to assist in demonstrating how one sideslips while belayed by 
a rope. One of the more skilled skiers could have done the belaying, 
thereby further engaging the other team members.
7. … the mountaintops have disappeared into cloud …
 Clearly, there is a lack of situational awareness. The poor weather 
is only noted when faced by a tricky descent, a delay is mandatory 
and stress levels have increased.
8. Pete simply ignores him.
 A demonstration of poor leadership skills – Pete’s failure to deal 
with Sebastian’s frustration is a recipe for disaster that destroys 
team cohesion.
9.  … with clear irritation about the ‘incompetence’ of the others, 
Sebastian launches off the Col …
 Driven by frustration, Sebastian takes matters into his own hands. 
Harnessing his energy and drive earlier would have strengthened 
the team significantly. Even before the accident, the team needed to 
face a decision: to continue, or ski back down to the Argentière hut. 
On calm reflection by the team, they probably would have opted 
to turn back. Had Pete stopped the party and actively invited the 
opinions of other party members to gain consensus on a change of 
plan, Sebastian could have contributed to the discussion/consensus 
and Pete could have gained collective ‘buy-in’. Such a considered 
decision bonds a team well.
10. The team looks on with shock at his abrupt action …
 The team has been passively guided so far, making no spontaneous 
contributions until Sebastian is driven to an extreme decision. 
Team co-operation and active followership have not been 
established, and the team will now be harshly tested. Building an 
adequate response with a non-cohesive group-thinking team in 
this situation will be very difficult, and the risks to all have now 
escalated severely.
 ‘Good judgement is the result of experience and experience the 
result of bad judgement.’ (Mark Twain)
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